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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
A. A. EASTON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 8349

MILTON S. WYCOFF,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This case involves a claim for $17,700 damages, which
plaintiff and appellant alleges were caused to him by the
failure of defendant and respondent to make a ten-year
lease covering certain real property in accordance with an
alleged oral agreement. Plaintiff and appellant has appealed from an adverse judgment of the District Court
which granted defendant's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
For convenience, this brief will use the trial court's
designations of the parties hereto, and refers to the appellant, Easton, as "plaintiff"; and to the respondent, Wycoff,
as "defendant." All references to the official record on appeal are indicated hereafter by a capital R which precedes
the page number of the record; for instance, page 5 of the
record will be indicated as "R-5."
The facts, for the purpose of this appeal, consist of
the amended complaint ( quoted in plaintiff's brief) and a
stipulation made in open court that no written memorandum
of the alleged oral agreement ever existed or is claimed to
exist ( R-24).
Inasmuch as plaintiff has stated the background of this
litigation, in addition to setting forth the allegations of the
amended complaint, it will be appropriate to detail the
matters discussed by plaintiff with the understanding that
the allegations of the amended complaint, and no interpretation or summarization thereof, are the allegations upon
which the District Court granted defendant's motions and
entered summary judgment in defendant's favor.
This is the third case which has arisen from the same
transaction, wherein Wycoff sought to purchase the real
property located at 1554 South 2nd West, Salt Lake City,
Utah, in August, 1951. (See page 2, Brief of Appellant, on
file herein.) Wycoff, as plaintiff therein, prevailed in the
first law suit, brought in December, 1951, against the real
estate company and the owner of this property, to rescind
his offer to purchase said real estate herein involved, caused
by the seller's breach of the sales contract, and to recover
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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his earnest money. (See Wycoff vs. Bettilyon's, Inc. and
Friedman, Civil No. 94,108, in the District Court for Salt
Lake County. No appeal was taken from this decision.)
Thereafter, in the second case, one Robert P. Woolley, a
real estate broker, sought and recovered a commission from
Wycoff for securing plaintiff, A. A. Easton, as a tenant for
part of the same premises. (See Woolley vs. W ycofJ, 2
Utah 2d. 329, 273, P. 2d. 181; Henriod concurring, Wade
and Larson, D. J., dissenting.)
According to the allegations of the amended complaint,
plaintiff and defendant had conversations on three different dates: on August 9, 1951 ( R-11, par. 1 ), August 16,
1951 (R-12, par. 3), and August 20, 1951 (R-12, pars. 4,
5, and 6). Plaintiff alleges that an oral lease agreement
was effected during these discussions. Thereafter, the
amended complaint alleges that on August 22, 1951, "the
defendant formulated a conviction that he would not acquire the said premises and that title could not be cleared."
(R-14, par. 8.)
Some jurisdictional question may be involved in tpjs
case, although defendant does no more than to call it to
the Court's attention. Plaintiff did not file his notice of
appeal until April 7, 1955 (R-26), although the trial court,
which had previously granted two motions to dismiss the
complaint ( R-9) and the amended complaint ( R-20),
when it subsequently granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, ordered that the time for appeal was to
run from March 2, 1955 ( R-23).
ARGUMENT

I.

The doctrine of estoppel has no operation here be-
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cause the misrepresentations alleged involve only immaterial facts and a promise as to future conduct
which expressed no intent to abandon an existing
right.

II.

Plaintiffs claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds because said claim sounds in contract and essential elements of an action for fraud and deceit are lacking.

III.

No enforceable agreement was ever made. The parties
never reached a final agreement, and missing essential
elements of the alleged lease cannot be supplied by
parol.

POINT I.
The doctrine of estoppel has no operation here because
the misrepresentations alleged involve only immaterial facts
and a promise as to future conduct which expressed no
intent to abandon an existing right.
The question to be determined by the Court is whether
this is one of those rare cases where an oral promise clearly
within the Statute of Frauds can be removed from the clear
mandate of the Statute, which reads as follows:
U.C.A. 1953:

Sec. 25-5-1. "No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one
year ... shall be created ... otherwise than by a~t
or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance m
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writing subscribed by the party creating . . . the
same .... "
Sec. 25-5-3. "Every contract for the leasing for
a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of
any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing."
Sec. 25-5-4. "In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement, or some
note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:
" ( 1) Every agreement that by its terms is not
to be performed within one year from the making
thereof."
Clearly, the requirements of the Statute have not been observed under the facts of this case, and any alleged oral
lease for ten years is void. But plaintiff urges that the District Court was in error, and that defendant is estopped
to plead the Statute due to certain alleged misrepresentations which he urges created an estoppel, preventing the
application of the clear language of the Statute. The alleged misrepresentations, relied upon for this purpose by
plaintiff, are summarized at page 19 of appellant's brief,
as follows:
"This situation was created by the misrepresentations of the defendant, ( 1) that he owned the property, ( 2) that the plaintiff should take possession
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thereof, and ( 3) that a written lease would follow."
(Numbering added.)
It would seem only fair to point out that, although the
writer of the brief above-quoted states that defendant represented that plaintiff should take possession of the premises,
the language of the amended complaint only goes so far
as to state that defendant represented he could move into
the leased premises (see R-13, paragraphs 5 and 6). The
difference is obvious.

A representation that a person is the owner in possession of real property contains no presumption in fact or in
law that the representer will execute a contract to lease
said property. Any representation that plaintiff could take
possession of the premises at a future date, and that a written lease would be prepared by the defendant's attorney,
is an indication that there were matters yet to be agreed
upon. The alleged misrepresentation as to ownership and
possession are not material here
The Utah Supreme Court has never departed from the
following rule, established in Elliot v. Whitmore, 23 Utah
342, 65 P. 70, as set forth in the syllabus of the Court:
"An estoppel will not arise simply from a breach of
promise as to future conduct, or from a mere disappointment of expectations. The only case in which
a representation as to the future can be held to
operate as an estoppel is where it relates to an intended abandonment of an existing right."
This doctrine was cited with approval in Ravarino v. Price,
260 P. 2d 570, which plaintiff attempts to distinguish from
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the instant case. There are certain distinctions to be noted,
but all of them make the Ravarino case more favorable to
defendant. Unlike the instant claim for money damages,
the Ravarino case contained two counts: one in equity for
specific performance of an alleged oral contract to convey
land, and one for money damages. The doctrines of part
performance and estoppel are stated "to be indistinguishable." (See footnote 1, Ravarino case, 260 P. 2d at 574.)
The Court also makes short shrift of the count for money
damages (see last page of the opinion) after discussing at
length and rejecting the equitable arguments of estoppel
in the first count for specific performance, in the following
language:
"The second count in the complaint is an action at
law for money damages; however plaintiff cannot
obtain relief on that basis. It is well settled in this
jurisdiction that the doctrine of part performance is
not available in an action for damages on an oral
contract to convey land. (Baugh v. Darley, 112 Utah
1, 184 P. 2d 335. )"
Also in the Ravarino case, with which the Court is more
familiar than this writer, Justice Wolfe assembled and analyzed most of the authorities involving the doctrine of
estoppel to preclude the effect of the Statute of Frauds, and
it is only with the thought of making the conclusion of this
opinion readily accessible that the same is quoted, as follows, from 260 P 2d at 578:
"The authorities are against the proposition that
nonperformance of a promise is fraud which will
establish an estoppel in bais. Under the facts alleged the plaintiff could not make a case of equit-
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able estoppel under these principles of law,· since
the oral representations of Mr. Price that he would
GOmplete the negotiations constituted nothing more
than a promise a~' to future conduct, not a represent8tion as to· a material and existing fact nor the
expression of an intent to aba1idon an existing right.
Further, we have examined the cases relied on by
plaintiff, and think that the doctrine they announce
is eitl1er consistent with the foregoing· principles of
equitable estoppel or where the facts show possession of the premises and improvement of the land
by the party claiming the fraud, which brings us to
a consideration of the doctrine of part performance,
as before stated a species of estoppel:"
The editors of 19 American Jurisprudence 656, Sec.
52, state the following general principles:
"The general rule is well settled that in order to
furnish the basis of an estoppel, a representation or
assurance must relate to some present or past fact
or state of things, as distinguished from mere promises or expressions of opinion as to the future. A
truthful statement as to the present intention of a
party with regard to his future act is not the foundation upon which an estoppel may be built. A person cannot be bound, by any rule of morality or
good faith, not to change his intention, nor can he
be precluded from showing such change merely because he has previously represented that his intentions were once different from those which he eventually executed. The reason on which the doctrine
of estoppel rests wholly fails when the representation relates only to a present intention or purpose
of a party, because, its nature ·being uncertain and
liable to change, it could not properly form a basis
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or inducement upon which a party could reasonabl;,
adopt any fixed and permanent course of action."
Nowhere in the amen~ed complaint does plaintiff allege that defendant had an existing right to lease the premises. Plaintiff merely alleges that defendant represent~ d
that defendant was the owner and in possession of the premises ( R-12 to 13, paragraphs 4, 5, and 6), or that plaintiff
believed defendant was entitled to lease the premises ( R-15,
paragraph 9. In addition, according to the amended complaint, all of said representations as to ownership were
made between August 9, 1951, and August 20, 1951, which
period was prior to the time defendant decided not to
purchase the premises on August 22, 1951 ( R-14, paragraph
8); therefore, defendant had no present intention not to
perform his alleged oral promises made before August 22,
1951.
The authorities which plaintiff relies on are discussed
in Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 2, Sec. 533A, at
footnote 4, which classifies Interstate Bry-Block Mere. Co.,
30 Fed. 2d 172; Seytnour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 106 P. 88;
and Tchula Com. Co. v. Jackson, 147 Miss. 296, 111 So.
874; as cases where the doctrine of promissory estoppel has
been "extended to permit recovery on the contract by one
who has relied, to his detriment, on the promise of the
defendant to execute and deliver a sufficient memorandum."
Obviously, the case at bar does not involve a promise to
deliver a sufficient memorandum, because the only memorandum referred to by plaintiff is the lease which defendant's attorney was to prepare and submit to plaintiff ( R-12,
paragraph 3). The draft of the lease to be prepared by
defendant's attorney and, as alleged by plaintiff, to be sub-
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mitted directly to the plaintiH ( R-12, paragraph 3 ), although an unusual procedure, at least clearly establishes
that defendant had no opportunity to subscribe his name
thereto to constitute a sufficient memorandum, as required
by the Statute of Frauds.
The next sentence in the same section, of Williston on
Contracts, supra, reads as follows:
"A mere refusal to perform an oral agreement within
the Statute (of Frauds), however, is not such fraud
as will justify a court in disregarding the Statute
even though it result in hardship to the plaintiff."
(These three cases relied upon by plaintiff were also discussed and distinguished in the Ravarino case at 260 P. 2d
570, at p. 575. )
The doctrine of estoppel to assert the Statute of Frauds
has no application here.

POINT II.
Plaintiff's claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds because said claim sounds in contract and essential elements
of an action for fraud and deceit are lacking.
The following general principles are set forth at 49
American Jurisprudence 887, sec. 580:
" ... it is clear that the mere breach or violation of an oral agreement which is within the
statute of frauds, by one of the parties thereto, or his
mere denial of an agreement or refusal to perform
it, is not of itself a fraud either in equity or at law
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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from which the courts will give relief or which will
enable the other party to assert rights and defenses
based on the contract. If it were, the statute of
frauds would be rendered vain and nugatory. The
mere nonperformance of an oral contract, within the
statute which is pleaded, where no relation of trust
and confidence exists, does not constitute fraud
authorizing the interposition of a court of equity.
And the mere fact that the party to be charged expressly agreed that he would reduce the oral contract to writing is not sufficient to authorize a court
of equity to interpose. The statute of frauds cannot
be disregarded for the prevention of mere wrong or
to remedy possible losses. Wherever there is an
oral contract on which a party has relied, it is, in
some degree, a wrong and hardship upon him to
hold it invalid; the enforcement of the statute must
always be, in a sense (although, of course, not in
legal contemplation), a fraud or wrong upon him
against whom it is enforced."
Plaintiff cannot escape application of the Statute of
Frauds by alleging his action sounds in tort and not in
contract, because the basis of plaintiff's claim is for the
alleged breach of a contract, and not a tort action for fraud
and deceit. This was settled in the case of Papanikolas v.
Sampson, 73 Utah 404, 274 P. 856, an action for damages
caused by the alleged false promises and misrepresentations
of the defendant, including a promise, alleged to be false,
that, if plaintiff would not defend a real estate mortgage
foreclosure action, defendant would resell said real estate
to plaintiff for $20,000, although the premises were reasonably worth $56,000. Plaintiff contended that he acted in
reliance upon said false representation, to his damage, but
the Court held that the gravamen of plaintiffs action was
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for the breach of an oral contract within the Statute of
Frauds, as follows:
"The controlling question in our opinion is, Is tllis
an action at law to recover damages for fraud and
deceit as contended by appellants, or is it an action
for breach of contract for the sale of land as contended by respondents? If the former, the statute
of frauds does not apply. If the latter, the statute
applies and the action cannot be maintained. The
sections of the statute pleaded by defendants (sections 4874, 5811, and 5813, Comp. ~aws Utah 1917)
provide in substance that contracts for the sale of
land are void unless in writing. What is the gravamen of plaintiffs' cause of action? What is the relief
sought and what are the grounds for such relief?
These are pertinent questions here ....
"It is undisputed that the contract alleged in
the complaint was an oral contract for the sale of
real estate, and while it is ·contended by plaintiffs
that they are not suing for damages for a breach of
the contract, but for damages for fraud and deceit,
they, nevertheless, pray for a sum equal in amount
to the difference in the actual value of the property
as alleged by them and the amount they were to
pay for it under the alleged promises and representations made by defendants. The amount of damages
claimed exactly coinciding with the measure of damages for a breach of contract, together with the
other elements above mentioned, are persuasive in
a high degree that this is an action for a breach of
contract and not an action for fraud and deceit. It
is true that plaintiffs allege that the promises and
representations made by defendants were fraudulent
and made with intent to deceive and mislead plaintiffs and lull them into a sense of security in order
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that defendants might obtain title to the property
in question and deprive plantiffs thereof; but such
alle~ations are not even evidence, much less proof
of the fact. Whether the gravamen of plaintiffs'
cause of action is damages for breach of contract or
Jam:J.:rc"; for fraud must be determined by the law
applicable to the facts of the case.
"It follows from the foregoing discussion that the
court is of opinion that this is an action for a breach
of contract for the sale of real estate, and, the contract being verbal, it is barred by the statute of
frauds."

The Court, in the Ravarino case, supra, also quotes
from the Papanikolas case, at 260 P. 2d 578, as follows:
"Nor, as a g-eneral rule, can fraud be predicated
upon the failure to perform a promise or contract
which is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds,
since in such case the promissor has not, in a legal
sense, made a contract, and hence has the right,
both in law and in equity, to refuse to perform."
The Papanikolas case, 274 P. 856, at p. 861, also makes clear
that a fraudulent intent must have existed when the alleged
false promises and misrepresentations were made:
"Unless a fraudulent intention existed when the alleged promises and representations were made, they
would not constitute fraud for which an action at
law for deceit could be maintained."
The requisite intent is lacking here, as was pointed out in
detail under Point I of this brief.
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The same rule has been followed in Nielson v. Leamington Mines & Exploration Corporation, 87 Utah 69, 48
P. 2d 439, an action to set aside a deed to certain mining
claims. The Supreme Court reversed the lower Court for
its refusal to grant defendant's motion for nonsuit, and
stated:
"To predicate a cause of action in fraud upon a failure to perform a promise, there must be an intention
on the part of the promisor at the time of making
the promise not to perform it.

" 'If the promise is made in good faith when the
contract is entered into there is no fraud, though the
promisor subsequently changes his mind and fails
or refuses to perform.' 12 R. C. L. 262; Hull v.
Flinders, 83 Utah, 158, 27 P. ( 2d) 56. Nonperformance of the promise alone is not evidence of fraud.
12 R. C. L. 255."
Plaintiff's amended complaint does not state that defendant made his alleged promise to lease the premises
with the intent not to perform it. Rule 9(b ), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, requires that fraud be pleaded with
particularity. Such facts have not been alleged here, in
neither the complaint nor the amended complaint.
Cases on this particular problem have been selected
and analyzed in a series of annotations entitled, "Promises
and Statements as to Future Events as Fraud." (51 ALR
46, as supplemented in 68 ALR 635, 91 ALR 1296, and
125 ALR 879. ) The general rule is stated at 51 ALR 49,
as follows:
"The general rule, which is supported by numerSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ous decisions in almost all jurisdictions, is that fraud
must relate to a present or pre-existing fact, and
cannot ordinarily be predicated on unfulfilled promises or statements as to future events. There are
various reasons for this general rule, applicable according to the particular circumstances. The usual
grounds assigned are that such representations and
promises should be regarded merely as statements
of opinion, hopes, or expectations, on which the
party to whom they are made has no legal right to
rely, and that a statement as to a future event cannot, i~ the very nature of the case, be false when
made.
The principal exception to the general rule is that fraud
may be predicated on promises clearly made without an
intention of performance. Utah has recognized this exception (Zion's Co-op Home Building and Real Estate Company, 46 Utah 1, 148 P. 401; and Hull v. Flinders, 83 Utah
158, 27 P. 2d .56), although a minority view holds that
fraud cannot be predicated on any promise to do a thing
in the future, regardless of intent. (See Division II in the
annotations just described.) It is submitted that the general n1le would apply here.
A few of the many cases from other jurisdictions which,
as in this case, involve only a refusal to perform an oral
promise which is void under the Statute of Frauds, and
where it has been held that an action for fraud could not
be maintained, are as follows: Davidson v. Edwards, 168
Ark. 306, 270 SW 94; Little v. Union Oil, 73 Cal. App. 612,
238 P. 1066; Hazleton v. Lewis, 267 Mass. 533, 166 NE 876;
Moore v. DeBernardi, 47 Nev. 33, 213 P. 1041, (reh. den.,
47 Nev. 46, 220 P. 544); Lovett v. Taylor, 54 NJ Eq. 311,
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34 A. 896; Levy v. Brush, 45 NY 589; Wheeler v. Reynolds,
66 NY 227.
POINT III.
No enforceable agreement was ever made. The parties
never reached a final agreement, and missing essential elements of the alleged lease cannot be supplied by parol.
Although plaintiff believes the foregoing arguments,
under Points I and II herein, have fully answered the points
raised by plaintiff in his appeal, another reason yet remains
why the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.
It is because plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, through failure and inability to show
in the amended complaint that a valid and enforceable contract exists. As stated in a case very factually similar to
the case at bar, Rosenfield v. United States Trust Company,
200 Mass. 210, 195, NE 323:
"Normally, the fact that parties contemplate the
execution of a final written agreement effects a
strong inference that the parties do not intend to
be bound by earlier negotiations or agreements until
the final terms are settled."
Under facts more favorable to plaintiff than in the instant
case, because a letter existed, subscribed by the defendant
oil company, the Utah Supreme Court, in Birdzell v. Utah
Oil Refining Company, ........ Utah ........ , 242 P. 2d 578, at
page 580, stated as follows:
"The above letter will not suffice as an adequate
memorandum because it lacks an acknowledgment
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or recognition that a contract has been entered into
by the parties. See Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 2,
Sees. 503, 511; Ebling Brewing Co. v. Cereal Products Co., 2 Cir., 6 F. 2d 984; Franklin Sugar Refining
Co. v. John, 279 Pa. 104, 123 A. 685; Upton Mill &
Elevator Co. v. Baldwin Flour Mills, 147 Minn. 205,
179 N.W. 904. Such acknowledgment or recognition need not be shown by memorandum in cases
where a written and signed offer is relied upon as
a memorandum because the acceptance may be
proved by oral testimony. But in the instant case
the appellant does not contend that he made an oral
acceptance to an offer made in writing and signed
by the respondent. He claims to have made an
oral acceptance to an oral offer made by the respondent, and that the letter appearing above is a
memorandum of that contract having been written
after the alleged contract had been entered into.
Under his contention, the appellant must fail since
there is nothing in the letter which expressly or impliedly lends authenticity to the existence of the
alleged oral agreement theretofore made by the
parties ....
"However, even if the letter did contain an admission, acknowledgment, or recognition of the alleged prior oral agreement, there is another reason
why it will not suffice as a memorandum. It is
fundamental that the memorandum which is relied
upon to satisfy the statute of frauds must contain all
the essential terms and provisions of the contract.
Collett v. Goodrich, Utah, 231, P. 2d 730; Hawaiian
Equipment Co. v. Eimco Corp., Utah, 207 P. 2d
794."
To mention only one of the essential elements that is missing
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in the alleged oral lease, it does not specify the time and
manner of payment of the rental alleged.
The Utah Supreme Court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment in the Birdzell case, even though
the defendant had written a letter which plaintiff therein
contended was a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds. No such memorandum exists in the case
at bar, nor does it involve a written offer to lease which
may be accepted orally, as pointed out above. The case
at bar involves, at best, only an alleged oral offer which
plaintiff attempts to accept orally, which our law does not
permit against the defense of the Statute of Frauds. No
definite agreement was ever reached, and could not be
reached until the proposed lease was reduced to writing,
as contemplated by the parties.
Plaintiff's claim must also fail because he can neither
plead nor prove the existence of the alleged lease and its
essential elements.
CONCLUSION
The District Court committed no error in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, because plaintiff's
claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds and does not state
a clain1 upon which relief can be granted.
WHEREFORE, M. S. Wycoff, defendant and respondent, prays that the judgment of the lower court be affirmed
with costs to respondent.
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Respectfully submitted,
WAYNE C. DURHAM,

Attorney for defendant
and respondent.
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